A next day of the very first anniversary from the Navy SEAL raid that killedOsama bin Laden, the U.S. released an uncommon pr exerciseagainst the late leader of al-Qaeda by delivering an incomplete butrevealing tranche from the documents grabbed throughout the raid at thecompound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The very first number of 17 Letters from Abbottabad’ were openedup towards the public through the U.S. Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) atWest Point military academy, plus they recommended the al-Qaedawas exactly the same to regular corporate or social organisations inits proclivity to obtain swept up within the politics of internalsquabbles and acrimony, mostly against other terror groups such asthe Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The letters happen to be vetted and converted by counterterrorismexperts in the CTC and therefore are in electronic form adding up to 175 pagesin the initial Arabic and 197 pages within the British translation.
Inthis first tranche, the first letter is dated September 2006 andthe latest April 2011, using the internal al-Qaeda communicationsauthored by a number of leaders, including bin Laden, Atiyya Abdal-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and also the American terror suspect AdamGadahn. On one side, the sheer selection of discussants engaged incommunications with al-Qaeda suggests the depth ofinterconnections between numerous high-profile terror groups.Good examples include Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, leader from the Somalimilitant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin Nasir al-Wuhayshi,leader from the Yemen-based al-Qaeda within the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)and Anwar al-`Awlaqi and Hakimullah Mahsud, leader from the TTP. Yet equally the letters show cracks and ideological and tacticalrifts opening between these the leaders of those organisations.For instance in a single letter (SOCOM-2012-0000004) compiled by Gadhan inJanuary 2011, he dramatically criticises the tactics and targetingcalculus from the Islamic Condition of Iraq and also the TTP, while stronglyadvocating that al-Qaeda openly dissociate itself from bothgroups. In another letter (SOCOM-2012-0000005), bin Laden themself politelyrefuses a request from al-Shabaab’s leader al-Zubayr for formalunity with al-Qaeda. Ironically after bin Ladin’s dying, the Somalimilitant group merged with al- Qaeda. a.
Most revealingly, one letter from al-Qaeda’s al-Hasan and al-Libithe amir from the TTP, Hakimullah Mahsud, shows deep-sitting ideologicaland proper variations. Dated December 3 2010, the letter(SOCOM-2012-0000007) lays bare the intense concerns that theal-Qaeda bosses had concerning the TTP’s tactics within Pakistan, withan eye around the effects the TTP’s “misguidedoperations” may have on al-Qaeda along with other terror groups inthe region. Particularly the CTC experts looking at the letters noted that theal-Qaeda authors recognized several errors committed through the TTP,including Hakimullah Mahsud’s arrogation of rights andpositions beyond that which was appropriate because the TTP’s amir the TTP’s utilization of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslimcivilians, and also the group’s utilization of kidnapping. Such disenchantment among a number of terror bosses about al-Qaeda’swillingness to handle attacks that may affect Muslims appearsto be considered a theme inside the Abbottabad letters.
Another letter(SOCOM-2012-0000018) launched through the CTC on Thursday, delivered to binLaden from “a loving brother whom you are aware of who knowsyou” is crucial of bin Laden for permitting attacks on”Islamic nations generally and also the Arabian Peninsula inparticular.” The writer of the missive enumerated numerous deleteriousconsequences of participating in jihad inside Saudi Arabia, and informed Zamarai , a nickname for bin Laden, that individuals were “offended by thetechnical term jihad’ as well as forbidden for doing things inlectures,” and also the author wise bin Laden tochange his guidelines.
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